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Introduction

The American federal civil litigation system is distinctive in numerous ways. One that
has been the focus of ongoing controversy is the extensive system of litigant-initiated
discovery in the U.S., which operates under the strong presumption that the party
responding to a discovery request bears the direct costs of compliance with that request.
This system gives parties to a civil lawsuit the ability to impose potentially substantial
information-gathering costs on their adversaries. While the empirical facts are disputed,
it is often argued that this cost-externalization ability leads to misuse of the discovery
process.
For several decades, proponents of reform have pushed for changes to Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 26, which sets forth the overall framework of civil discovery in the U.S.
system. The history and details of efforts to restrict or modify the terms of discovery are
too complex for discussion here.1 However, a pending rule change, which will take effect
December 1, 2015, unless Congress acts to stop it, has rewritten and re-emphasized the
text of what has come to be known as the discovery proportionality standard.2 Here
is a summary, if certainly a serious over-simplification, of the proportionality standard,
mapped into simple economic terms: in at least some cases where only monetary damages
are at stake, discovery will be considered non-proportional if the plaintiff’s perceived
benefits are less than the costs to the defendant of providing it. For example, a request to
∗ University
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thought-provoking comments. In addition, I thank Christoph Engel, Eric Helland, Jennifer
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1 For discussions with some details, see, e.g., Gelbach and Kobayashi (forthcoming) or Gelbach (2015).
2 The Proposed Rules submitted for Congressional consideration by Chief Justice John
Roberts, together with substantial commentary from various players in the Rulemaking process, are available at http://www.uscourts.gov/file/18022/download?token4̄S6SRw0T.
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conduct discovery that would cost $200,000 would in many cases fail the proportionality
standard if the plaintiff seeks only $100,000 in damages.3
While the text of the new Rule is not obviously that different from earlier versions,
many worry—and others hope—that federal trial courts will respond by tightening up
on requesters’ access to discovery. If proportionality objections to discovery become
more common, federal judges will have to use a subjective balancing approach, based on
several difficult to observe factors, to determine whether to allow discovery. The direct
costs of conducting discovery may be difficult for judges to observe. So too with the
subjective ex ante values the parties place on having the fruits of future discovery: presumably plaintiffs and defendants sometimes agree and sometimes disagree concerning
these values.
The challenges of eliciting information under such conditions are of course not new to
economists; they are the domain of mechanism design. One aim of this paper, therefore,
is to ask whether mechanism design can help judges create incentives that would induce
partes to provide the relevant information.
An antecedent question, though, is why discovery occurs at all. Discovery is costly
and unlikely to be valuable to the producing party outside litigation. From an ex ante
perspective, then, there is the possibility that agreeing to forego discovery would create
some surplus. Therefore, parties with sufficiently aligned beliefs about the likely results
of producing discovery might often have an incentive to engage in what I call a “discovery
settlement”: an agreement in which one party pays the other to forego discovery, even if
the overall lawsuit is not settled. The possibility that such efficient trades might occur
echoes the Coase Theorem: with no bargaining costs, agents will reach efficient bargains
in the absence of outside intervention, and regardless of the particular rules of discovery.
I emphasize that even when Coasean results do obtain, the discovery cost allocation
rule will affect the distribution of welfare, as usual in Coasean analysis. Obviously, requesters will do better under a system in which they must be paid to forego discovery
demands than under a system in which they must pay responders to carry them out. It
is widely thought that liberal discovery imposes greater burdens on defendants than on
plaintiffs, which helps to explain the why organizations that represent the interests of
those who are more frequently defendants in consumer/employee-versus-business litigation have supported increasing the emphasis on proportionality, as well as, in some cases,
a shift to responder-can-refuse. It also helps to explain why plaintiff-side attorneys, public interest organizations, and academics who are often sympathetic to plaintiffs’ interests
have generally opposed this increased emphasis.
3 The

primary exception to this generalization involves situations in which conducting the
discovery likely would create valuable spillovers. For example, suppose 100 plaintiffs have sued
the same defendant in 100 different cases, with each plaintiff seeking $100,000 in damages
for the same alleged misconduct. Suppose the proper disposition of all 100 cases would be
substantially more likely via discovery that costs the defendant $1 million. The language of
the proportionality standard creates space for the judge in one of the 100 cases to find the
discovery in question proportional. Discovery might also be found proportional if it were
valuable to future regulatory or policy making work, and so on.
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To my knowledge, the simple Coasean point that disfavored discovery will not happen
if bargaining is sufficiently easy, has not been made either in debates among litigation
policy makers or among scholars. That should be surprising, since Coasean ideas have
been around for half a century,4 only slightly longer than economic analyses of the civil
litigation system,5 while concerns about the overuse of discovery are also not new.6 To
be sure, there has been a lot of analysis concerning the question of whether the American
rule or the British rule is better, and whether this question is even sensible in light of
Coasean reasoning.7 And there have been numerous analyses focused at least in part on
the role of discovery in civil litigation.8 But none of these analyses seriously considers the
possibility that the parties might bargain discretely over the right to discovery, “settling”
only that question while continuing to keep the overall litigation alive. Indeed, Cooter
and Rubinfeld’s (1994, p. 454) influential paper on the issue of discovery specifically
assumes “that the plaintiff and defendant cannot cooperate together and reach a mutual
agreement to constrain discovery.” Yet it seems likely, and if not certain, that discovery
settlements would be enforceable via joint stipulation. After all, stipulations happen
all the time in federal civil litigation, including those involving agreements limiting or
describing the extent of discovery that will be conducted.9 In this paper I conduct the
Coasean thought experiment of asking whether, when bargaining is frictionless, efficient
deals to avoid disfavored discovery would obtain.
To frame the discussion of legal rules and the efficiency of dicovery, I imagine that the
federal courts adopted a supercharged version of the proportionality standard, by simply
shifting to a system in which the responder has the right to refuse discovery requests for
any reason. Under this alternative “responder-can-refuse” rule, requesters would have
to compensate responders not only for the direct costs of providing discovery, but also
for the responder’s ex ante valuation of the costs to the responder due to a shift toward
the requester in the case’s merits.10
4 See

Coase (1960).
e.g., Posner (1971).
6 See, e.g., Easterbrook, “Discovery as Abuse” (1989); Mullenix (1994).
7 See, e.g., Shavell (1982) and Donohue (1991).
8 See, e.g., Cooter and Rubinfeld (1994); Hay (1994); Sobel (1989); Shavell (1997); Shavell
(1989); Mnookin and Wilson (1998); Farmer and Pecorino (2013).
9 Indeed, Rule 26(f) requires the parties to attempt to agree on a discovery plan, and other
Rules implicitly or explicitly provide for stipulations waiving discovery rights.
10 A number of commentators have proposed shifting to an intermediate rule under which
the requester must pay for discovery; see CITES [including Cooter and Rubinfeld’s two-part
rule]. Rule 26(c) currently provides that parties facing discovery requests may seek an order
“to protect a party or person from ... undue burden or expense,” including the imposition of
various terms on the discovery in question. Another proposed amendment to Rule 26 would
add “the allocation of expenses” to the list of such terms. That would explicitly allow judges
to require the requester to pay some or all of the cost of providing the requested discovery.
Note that this legal rule would introduce a further adjudicative difficulty—determining which
expenses are reasonable and thus shiftable to the requester. An assessment of that rule would
require one to take seriously the possibility of private information concerning the direct cost
5 See,
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I verify the expected Coasean result in a stylized model, which I introduce in section 2. In the model, a plaintiff-requester and a defendant-responder each receive a
signal indicating the likely value to the plaintiff’s case of discovery—low or high. I show
that when parties’ ex ante expectations concerning the value of discovery are known to
each other, Coasean bargains ensure that discovery occurs if and only if it is ex ante
subjectively efficient.
In reality, of course, agents’ subjective beliefs are private information. Given specified
terms of Coasean bargains, parties might have incentives to either overstate or understate
their subjective beliefs concerning the value of discovery. With private information about
valuations, then, bargaining costs generally will not be zero. Consequently, the standard
Coasean analysis does not apply, and the Coasean result concerning the efficiency of
observed discovery might not hold. In section 3, I address this issue by using results
from the mechanism design and auction theory literatures to show how it would be
possible, for a court that knew the distribution of parties’ beliefs and valuations, to
construct a mechanism that would induce truthful revelation of the parties’ realized
valuations. This mechanism would allow the court to avoid not just disfavored discovery,
but also any use of discovery when the requester’s subjective valuation of discovery is
less than the responder’s overall subjective cost. That is, the mechanism achieves ex
post efficient results at the discovery stage. It also gives each party at least the payoff
it would receive if the party refused to participate in any the mechanism and trade were
impossible (a property known as interim individual rationality). Further, the range of
payoff distributions the court can achieve includes as a special case the distribution that
would obtain if the parties could engage in costless Coasean bargaining with a fixed
share of surplus going to the plaintiff. Finally, while the mechanism does not break even
in every state of nature, on average it requires no outside subsidies.
What makes the mechanism work, aside from the conventional if troubling assumption that its designer knows all relevant parameters, is the dependence in the joint
distribution of parties’ valuations of discovery: when one party thinks discovery is likely
to be highly valuable, so does the other. Under such conditions, Cremer and McLean
(1988) have shown that it is possible to design a mechanism that satisfies all the conditions in the previous paragraph.11 The mechanism I construct is based on their ideas,
and very similar to one displayed in McAfee and Reny (1992).
The efficient mechanism results come from an admittedly very stylized model. But
they suggest that a court with enough information to fully implement the proportionality
of discovery provision.
11 Myerson and Satterthwaite (1983) have famously showed that the collection of properties
described in the text cannot all occur in bilateral trade with continuously and independently
distributed private valuations whose supports overlap. Schweizer (1989) presents a two-sided
asymmetric litigation model, with parties having common values in terms of their types, but
with (i) party types distributed independently and (ii) party type distributions each having
two points of support. Schweizer finds a similar result to Myerson and Satterthwaite’s: the
properties described in the text are not all achievable if there is nontrivial overlap in a certain
notion of the parties’ expected payoffs. The Cremer and McLean (1988) result does not hold
in these papers because in these papers agents’ valuations are assumed independent.
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standard described above could do quite a bit more: it could avoid disfavored discovery
while avoiding any redistribution of payoffs across parties due to restrictions on discovery.
That is important because distributional considerations have played an important role
in arguments over discovery reform in the U.S.
If that is the glass-is-half-full interpretation, there is also a half-empty one. The
informational requirements for the court to implement the mechanism just described are
enormous. It seems unlikely that courts will be able to do so in practice—just as it seems
unlikely they will be able to easily implement a system that effects the proportionality
standard in the proposed-amended Rule 26.
What can or should a court do if it cannot design such mechanisms? That is the
subject of section 4. One approach would be for the court to auction off the discovery
right. Another would be to use a “posted-price” mechanism: the court announces a price,
and the right trades if and only if both parties agree to do so at the posted price.12 As
I discuss below, relevant forms of truth-telling are at least a weakly dominant strategy
with both mechanisms in the model I consider. But auctioning off the discovery right has
significant distributional consequences. And it is not clear how the court would know
what price to post, which is problematic since a poor choice could lead to the conduct of
disfavored discovery, or the failure of approved discovery to occur. A third alternative
that I address in only general terms would be for the court to adopt the Chatterjee and
Samuelson (1983) split-the-difference mechanism. That mechanism creates incentives to
behave strategically,13 and there is no reason to think it will be ex post efficient (even
when correlated types would allow a sufficiently informed mechanism designer to achieve
ex post efficiency). In sum, all of the administratively feasible mechanisms considered
have some normatively important drawback.
In section 5, I discuss the extent to which pre-discovery settlement of the overall
case—something that assuredly does happen in many cases—might replicate the performance of discovery settlements. Finally, I conclude in section 6.
Before I turn to the model, I address the important background question of what the
court’s objective should be. The conventional answer for economists would be something
like social welfare, after accounting for all effects of discovery rulings. These effects would
include not only the direct costs of discovery and the parties’ expectations concerning
its fruits, but also any encouragement or deterrence of behavior outside the lawsuit in
question.14
I shall not undertake that sort of conventional analysis, however. For one thing, the
proportionality standard does not exist in a procedural vacuum. Rule 1, for example,
states that the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure “should be construed and administered
12 Posted

prices are an example of robust mechanisms. On robust mechanism design, see Dirk
Bergemann and Stephen Morris, “Robust Mechanism Design”, 73 Econometrica 1771-1813
(2005) and Takuro Yamashita, “Implementation in Weakly Undominated Strategies: Optimality of Second-Price Auction and Posted-Price Mechanism”, forthcoming in Review of Economic
Studies (2015).
13 See, e.g., Myerson and Satterthwaite (1983); see also Lee and Klerman (2014).
14 See, e.g., Kaplow (1994), for a discussion of such effects.
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to secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action and proceeding.” Depending on how one implements the proportionality standard, the weights
placed on justice, speed, and frugality might well be altered.15 Further, there are numerous statutes in which Congress has provided for one-way fee shifting, with the result
that defendants are responsible for the litigation expenses incurred by victorious plaintiffs.16 These statutes are widely viewed as representing a legislative determination in
favor of private, rather than simply public, enforcement of certain rights, typically of
ones with discernible demographic groups as plaintiffs. These statutes were also enacted
against the backdrop of existing Federal Rules.17 More generally, amendments to the
Federal Rules are not supposed to “abridge, enlarge or modify any substantive right,”18
so it would be inappropriate to use Rules changes to alter the social objective function,
at least for suits in such spheres, in light of new emphasis on proportionality in discovery. Further, if a beefed-up proportionality standard led to a reduction in settlements,
it would conflict with the “public policy favoring the compromise and settlement of
disputes” flagged by the Advisory Committee on Rules of Evidence in explaining why
Federal Rule of Evidence 408 generally prohibits admissibility at trial of settlement offers; see also Marek v. Chesny, 473 U.S. 1, 10 (1985), which explains that Rule 68’s offer
of judgment terms expresses a “clear policy of favoring settlement of all lawsuits.” In
sum, it is difficult to discern an “overall” bottom line for analyzing how a new emphasis
on proportionality could be expected to affect the performance of the civil litigation
system as a whole.
In this paper, therefore, I shall not attempt a system-level evaluation of the effects
of greater emphasis on the costs and benefits of discovery. My more modest approach
instead begins with the idea that U.S. federal courts can be expected (i) to approve
of conducting discovery when the parties have a good-faith ex ante disagreement over
15 For

example, some believe that a responder-pays discovery system generates many unjust
impositions of expense, time, and hassle; see, e.g., Redish (2012). Others believe that discovery
is absolutely necessary to hold wrong-doers to account, especially those with the resources to
keep evidence from coming to light through alternative means. Depending on the substantive
law, it is easy to imagine that a proportionality standard with teeth would alter the balance
between these two justice interests. Further, justice, speed and inexpense are objectives that
often must be traded off rather than being simultaneously achieved in maximal measure. If
the proportionality standard induces more procedural wrangling, it might slow down pre-trial
proceedings substantially, even if its end result is socially desirable according to one’s chosen
metric. It might also require greater judicial expense even if it reduces the would-be responder’s
expense.
16 Examples in which such one-way fee shifting statutes exist include many types of civil
rights and employment-related lawsuits. Examples with two-way fee shifting—functionally,
the British rule—are much less common; copyright is one such setting. See 17 U.S.C. 505; see
also 35 U.S.C. 285, which provides for the award of fees to the prevailing party in “exceptional
cases.”
17 See Burbank (2015) (noting that “The Supreme Court is fond of reminding us that
Congress legislates against the background of the Federal Rules”).
18 See 28 U.S.C. 2072(b).
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the expected value of discovery in the case, with the requester sincerely believing the requested discovery’s value exceeds the cost of providing it, and (ii) to generally disapprove
of conducting discovery otherwise.19 The text of the proposed-amended Rule 26(b)(1)
suggests that this approach at least in large measure captures the concerns motivating
discovery-rule reformers; general commentary from those favoring the amendment is also
in line with it.
2

The Model and Complete Information Results

There are two parties: a single plaintiff, P, and a single defendant, D. If the case goes to
trial, a jury will determine whether the defendant is liable to the plaintiff, based on the
evidence that the parties present. If the jury finds the defendant liable, the defendant
will have to pay 1 unit of damages to the plaintiff; otherwise no damages will be paid
by either party.
2.1

Types of Evidence in the Model

There are two types of evidence relevant to the dispute. The first type of evidence includes testimony of the parties or other witnesses who have freely given publicly available
statements. Each party has access to such “common knowledge evidence”.20 Because
they have different assessments of the favorability of the jury pool, the quality of the
common knowledge evidence, the favorability of the legal standard, or any combination
of these, the parties disagree about what will happen at trial if only common knowledge
evidence is presented: the plaintiff believes that she will win with probability q, while the
defendant believes that the plaintiff will certainly lose. The parties’ beliefs about this
probability are common knowledge. The plaintiff believes the defendant is optimistic,
and the defendant believes the plaintiff is. Both understand that at most one can be
right, but there they are.21
19 An

important caveat is that discovery sometimes has external social effects—benefits that
accrue to, or costs that are inflicted on, non-parties. For analytical contributions on this issue,
see Shavell (1997) and Hay (1994); for discussions in the context of the propsed amendments to
the discovery proportionality standard, see Gelbach and Kobayashi (forthcoming) and Burbank
(2015).
20 Other examples of common knowledge evidence would include public documents or recordings, easily photographed scenes, and so on.
21 Such “mutual optimism” or “divergent expectations” models, which involve inconsistent
priors, have to a large extent fallen out of favor in economic modeling of litigation. For criticisms, see, e.g., Wickelgren (2013) or Daughety and Reinganum (2012); see also (Daughety and
Reinganum, 2014, p. 84), who describe signalling and screening asymmetric information models as “the two workhorses of settlement bargaining analyses.” While asymmetric information
models are interesting and may provide some insights, they also typically place a lot of artificial
structure on litigation behavior (on this point, see Daughety and Reinganum (1993)), and there
is no good empirical reason of which I am aware to assume that people having disputes have
consistent priors about what will happen at trial. The emphasis on asymmetric information
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Each party’s trial cost, measured in units of damages, is τ ∈ (0, 1), and the American
rule holds, so that each party bears its own litigation costs. I assume all of the foregoing
information is common knowledge. Therefore, if there is only common knowledge evidence, the case will go to trial if and only if there is not positive surplus to be had from
settlement. In the event of trial, the defendant’s subjective cost is τ , while the plaintiff’s
subjective gain is q − τ . Therefore, the surplus from settling is 2τ − q. To simplify the
discussion, I focus on cases that would go to trial in this situation, so I shall assume
that q > 2τ .
The second type of evidence is evidence that a party must physically possess, and
which is in the possession of exactly one party (though copies can be made). For simplicity, I assume that only the defendant holds any such “privately held evidence”. The
defendant’s cost of providing privately held evidence —whether for its own use or to
the other party via discovery—is c. Because the discovery of privately held evidence is
costly, it is possible that the parties will be able to reach a bargain that avoids costly
discovery. I call such a bargain a “discovery settlement” in order to emphasize that only
the question of whether costly discovery is provided is necessarily determined in such a
partial settlement; the overall case would continue.
As an example of privately held evidence, consider the contents of email traffic among
a firm’s employees. The cost of providing such evidence includes searching the firm’s
backed-up email for relevant information, as well as expenses related to redaction and
privilege-logging. It seems natural to imagine that the contents of privately held evidence might be asymmetrically known, even before expenditures are made to provide
it in discovery. For example, even without having searched its warehoused email, the
defendant might know for sure that it contains damaging information; the plaintiff might
suspect only the possibility that such damaging information exists. However, it is also
possible that the defendant does not know how damaging the email contents are and
cannot know without paying most or all of the costs of providing the evidence in the
first place. And it is also possible that the plaintiff knows for sure, or at least with
high probability, that the contents are damaging–say, because the plaintiff herself has
seen such email, or because of anonymous tips from one of the defendant’s employees.
Thus I assume that each party receives a (free) signal from nature about the value of
the defendant’s privately held evidence.
Let si ∈ {0, 1} be i’s signal about the value of the defendant’s privately held evidence,
to the total exclusion of inconsistent priors seems to be largely the result of methodological
trends in economic theory, rather than an empirically grounded development. (Schweizer, 1989,
p. 164), who provides an interesting and thoughtful asymmetric information model, put it well
when he wrote: “Obviously, decisions based on unqualified judgement and faulty views can
lead to litigation and, in fact, may actually do so quite frequently in real life. But, given that
the rationality of man is stressed elsewhere, the approach does not appear to be in accord with
the usual reasoning in the economic analysis of law. To preserve the postulate of rationality,
deviating assessments should rather be attributed to parties holding private information on
the merit of the case.” (Emphasis added.) Recent papers that at least partially adopt the
divergent expectations approach include (Rosenberg and Spier, forthcoming, Part III.4) and
Lee and Klerman (2014).

9
and define δi ≡ αsi +λ(1−si ). Leaving aside the effects of party j’s signal for the moment,
the parameter α is the increase in the value at trial of the plaintiff’s case that i would
expect when the signal value is 1, while λ is the increase in this value when the signal is
0.22 I assume α > λ, so si = 1 is a high-value signal and si = 0 is a low-value signal.
Now consider the interaction of parties’ signals. At the time they are received, if
party i knew both its signal and party j’s, it would believe that the use of privately
held evidence would increase the plaintiff’s payoff at trial by δi + γδj , where γ ≥ 0.
Thus, γ measures the sensitivity of each party’s discovery-related payoff to the other
party’s discovery-related information. For example, if both parties received the signal
that discovery is highly valuable—i.e., sd = sp = 1—then just before discovery occurred,
the plaintiff’s subjective value of her case would be q −τ +α(1+γ), while the defendant’s
subjective cost would be −τ − α(1 + γ).
The parameter γ allows for the possibility that the parties are differentially confident
in each other’s signals. If we were to insist on common priors concerning discovery’s value
to the plaintiff, then we would have γ = 1. Under this assumption, discovery would
always be privately wasteful if the parties had complete information about each other’s
pre-discovery signals. Since discovery is costly to conduct, the parties would always
agree not to conduct discovery, and even without complete information, it is difficult to
see how discovery would not inevitably be socially wasteful in the absence of spillovers
outside the case. I do not believe such a state of affairs would be accepted as an accurate
description of reality by most lawyers, judges, or legal policymakers. In reality, parties
or their attorneys might be overconfident about their own capacity to read their signals,
or they might doubt the capacity of their opponents to accurately read their signals,
even while ascribing good faith to them. There is no shortage of evidence that people
engage in self-serving beliefs, and litigation is a very ripe locus for motivated reasoning.23
Thus, I shall assume that γ < 1, so that parties put more weight on their own signals
than on their adversaries’. This means that it would sometimes be subjectively Pareto
22 We

might think of λ and α as representing an increase in the plaintiff’s probability of
winning the case and receiving 1 unit of damages. In that case logic requires that α < 1 − q.
But we could also think of these parameters as representing both an increase in the plaintiff’s
probability of winning and an increase in the damages she receives when she wins, with all
other variables still measured in units of damages based on only common knowledge evidence,
so I shall not worry about any upper bound on these discovery-value parameters.
23 As suggested in footnote 21 above, I do recognize that many, if not most, builders of economic models would reject the possibility of such beliefs, on the theory that fully rational agents
with the same information should hold the same beliefs about the implications of that information. I might cheekily point out that anyone who disagrees with me on this point must either be
wrong or have conceded that I am wrong. And since I’m not going to be disabused of my view,
the only equilibrium is one in which at least someone either is irrational, is wrong, or is going
to disagree despite being rational. On the question of whether everyone in the world is rational, see generally discussions of Lawrence Summers’s famous but difficult-to-find paper, which
began with the following two sentences: “THERE ARE IDIOTS. Look around.” (See blog
post by Ezra Klein, “There are idiots. Look around.”, http:voices.washingtonpost.comezraklein-200910there are idiots look around.html, October 23, 2009.)
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optimal for discovery to occur, even under complete information. For simplicity given
the illustrative nature of this paper’s model, I shall go even further, and assume that
γ = 0. This simplifies aspects of the analysis by yielding a private-value problem, though
my preliminary analysis suggests that all the important qualitative results likely hold,
or can be sensibly modified, without this assumption. In addition to the assumptions
above, I shall assume throughout that 0 < λ < c < λ + c < α.
2.2

Coasean Results with Complete Information over Signal Values

In the first case, assume that the parties receive the same signals about the value of
privately held evidence, so that δp = δd = δ. Since it is costly to discover the evidence,
there is positive surplus available from a discovery settlement. The defendant’s total cost
from undergoing discovery is c + δ, while the plaintiff’s total gain is δ, so the amount
of surplus available is the cost of discovery, c. Let the plaintiff’s share of surplus in
bargaining be β. Then in equilibrium, the defendant will pay the plaintiff her reservation
value plus the share β of the discovery cost, i.e., δ + βc. There will be no discovery, and
the case will go to trial with only common knowledge evidence introduced.24 Expected
payoffs as of the pre-discovery stage will be (δ + βc) for the plaintiff and −(δ + βc) for
the defendant.
Next, suppose that sp = 0 and sd = 1. In this situation the parties will also reach
a discovery settlement. The defendant’s subjective total cost of conducting discovery is
α + c, which exceeds the plaintiff’s subjective gain of λ. In equilibrium, the defendant
will pay the plaintiff β(α + c − λ); once again there will be no discovery, and the case will
go to trial with only common knowledge evidence introduced. Discovery stage payoffs
will be β(α + c − λ) for the plaintiff and −β(α + c − λ) for the defendant.
Finally, suppose sp = 1 and sd = 0, so that the defendant’s subjective total cost of
discovery c + λ, while the plaintiff values it at α. In this case, the parties’ disagreement about the value of the defendant’s privately held evidence means that discovery
settlement will not be feasible. Since α > c + λ by assumption, the plaintiff’s subjective
belief is that discovery is more valuable than the defendant’s overall subjective cost of
providing it. There will be no discovery settlement, so costly discovery will occur. The
plaintiff’s payoff is α, while the defendant’s is −(c + λ).
Now consider what happens if we switch from a responder pays discovery system to
one in which the requester must purchase the right to discovery from the responder. We
have the usual Coasean result: given that the parties can bargain costlessly, discovery
will occur if and only if its subjective value to the plaintiff is greater than its subjective
cost to the defendant. In particular, whether discovery occurs does not depend on the
allocation of discovery rights.
Of course, the distribution of payoffs very much depends on the allocation of the right
to demand or refuse discovery. If we reverse the discovery cost allocation rule, then the
defendant will not have to pay the plaintiff to avoid discovery in those instances in which
24 Recall

that the parties’ disagreement concerning the common knowledge evidence is sufficient to render pre-trial settlement in the absence of discovery impossible.
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it does not occur. Thus, both parties’ discovery stage payoffs will equal 0 in any state in
which discovery does not occur. In the one state in which discovery does occur—when
sp = 1 and sd = 0—the surplus from trade is (α − c − λ) and the parties’ reservation
payoffs are 0, so the defendant’s payoff will be (1 − β)(α − c − λ), while the plaintiff’s
will be β(α − c − λ). Switching the discovery cost allocation rule thus strictly reduces
the plaintiff’s payoffs, while strictly increasing the defendant’s.
As usual in the zero-bargaining costs setting, then, the endowment of rights has
important normative implications (unless wealth maximization is the social objective
function). At the level of generality considered in the model that assumes ex post efficient bargains always occur, then, the choice between discovery cost allocation rules has
nothing to do with how much discovery occurs, and boils down to a purely distributional
choice.
An obvious question is how the parties can be expected to find their way to a discovery settlement when their mutual signals are private information, rather than common
knowledge.25 I turn to that issue in the next sections.
3

A Mechanism Implementing the Ex Post Efficient Result

In this section I assume the court knows the probability distribution of the parties’
signals, as well as the values of c, λ, and α. I then construct a class of mechanisms based
on one displayed in McAfee and Reny (1992).26 Each member of this class implements
the ex post efficient result, with discovery actually occurring if and only if its value
to the requester-plaintiff exceeds its overall cost to the responder-defendant. Each such
mechanism also breaks even on average. Finally, the mechanisms are interim individually
rational: they all provide the parties with at least their expected payoff in the no-trade
regime, even after parties observe their own signals, so that no party would have to be
ordered to participate.27
Define the probability that the parties’ signals equal (sp , sd ) as πsp sd . For simplicity,
I shall assume that π00 = π11 = 3/8 and π01 = π10 = 1/8.28 Thus the probability
distribution over (sp , sd ) realizations can be represented by the matrix
"3
(1)
25 For

Π=

8
1
8

1
8
3
8

#
,

detailed discussions of why the standard Coase result might not hold when there is
private information, see, e.g., McKelvey and Page (2002), McKelvey and Page (1999), and
Farrell (1987).
26 That mechanism itself is based on an idea discussed in Cremer and McLean (1988).
27 That requirement is not a nicety, given that a court’s order that the parties participate in
the type of mechanism described here might well be treated as violating one or more Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure, whereas voluntary compliance might not.
28 This example is adopted from Kushnir (2014).
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with the plaintiff’s type held constant along the rows and the defendant’s type held
constant along the columns.29 The type distribution is dependent in this case: the
marginal probability that a party has signal si = x is one-half for x ∈ {0, 1}, while the
conditional probability that si = x given that sj = x is three-fourths. Thus, types in
this example are positively correlated, reflecting the likelihood that knowledge that one
party believes discovery will help the plaintiff should increase the probability that the
other party will think this same thing.
In an appendix available online, I construct a class of mechanisms in three steps.
First, assuming that the plaintiff owns the right to insist on discovery, I introduce the
incentive compatible “pre-mechanism” in McAfee and Reny (1992). This mechanism is
a specialization of the dominant-strategy double auction in McAfee (1992) to the oneseller, one-buyer case, and it can be viewed as an extension of the Vickrey auction to
the double-auction setting:30 (i) each party reports a value; (ii) the discovery right is
allocated to whichever party’s reported value is greater; (iii) the party that wins the
auction pays a fee equal to the loser’s reported value; and (iv) the party that loses the
auction pays a fee equal to the winner’s reported value. This pre-mechanism will transfer
the right to avoid discovery whenever there is ex post surplus from doing so, so it is ex
post efficient.
Obviously, though, the pre-mechanism requires net outside subsidies from the Court.
Therefore, the second step is to construct a set of participation fees that the parties must
pay if they wish to participate in the pre-mechanism designed in step one. These participation fees extract all surplus from the parties, leaving them just indifferent between
participating in the auction and not doing so. Thus there is net positive revenue from
the combined operation of the pre-mechanism and the participation fees.
The third step is to determine a pair of lump-sum transfers to the parties, whose
total amount equals the (expected) surplus extracted via the second-step participation
fees, so that the parties rather than the court realize all gains from trade. By varying
the share of the surplus received by each party via these lump-sum transfers, the court
can achieve any distribution of the discovery settlement surplus across the parties.
I provide details on the construction of this mechanism in the online appendix. Under
the default rule that the requester-plaintiff owns the right to discovery, the mechanism
following step two can be summarized by the following transfer functions Tep and Ted
29 It

would be straightforward to rework my model so that parties’ signals provide information
about the probability that the fact finder would find the defendant liable, with this probability
then revealed to both parties once discovery occurs. Assuming party i knows the conditional
distribution of party j’s signal given i’s observed signal, the probabilities πsp sd represented in
the matrix Π would be calculable for each party. All that is needed for a mechanism of the type
I discuss in this section to exist is for the matrix Π to exhibit statistical dependence; I have
verified that there exists a version of such a model that generates the specific numbers used in
(1). I have chosen not to present such a model since it is notationally more involved. Also, in
such a model, case settlement would always happen immediately after discovery, contradicting
the fact that some cases do go to trial in the real world.
30 See, e.g., Yoon (2001).
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specifying amounts paid by the parties to the court:31
1
c + 38 α − 11
λ,

8
8


− 3 c − 9 α + 1 λ,
Tep (sp , sd ) = 9 8 3 8 3 8

c + α − λ,


8 3 8 9 8 1
− 8 c − 8 α + 8 λ,
5
c − 18 α + 98 λ,

8


 5 c − 1 α + 9 λ,
8
8
Ted (sp , sd ) = 98
3
3

c + 8 α − 8 λ,


 98
c + 11
α − 83 λ,
8
8

(2)

(3)

sp
sp
sp
sp
sp
sp
sp
sp

= 0, sd
= 0, sd
= 1, sd
= 1, sd

= 0, sd
= 0, sd
= 1, sd
= 1, sd

=0
=1
=0
=1

=0
=1
.
=0
=1

It can be shown that party i’s expected payoff, given its type si and taking expectations over the conditional distribution of party j’s type, equals the payoff that party i
would receive in the absence of any trade. Therefore this mechanism satisfies the usual
interim individual rationality constraint.32 This mechanism can also be shown to raise
net expected revenue in the amount of R = 78 c + 18 (α − λ), which can be redistributed
to the parties in lump-sum fashion. Let ρ be the share of this revenue that the court
assigns to the plaintiff. Then the transfers from the parties to the court will be
Tp∗ (sp , sd ) ≡ Tep (sp , sd ) − ρR
T ∗ (sp , sd ) ≡ Ted (sp , sd ) − (1 − ρ)R.

(4)
(5)

d

It can be shown that the parties’ expected payoffs that result from this “ρ-mechanism”
are
1
EUp (ρ) ≡ (α + λ) + ρR
2
1
EUd (ρ) ≡ −c − (α + λ) + (1 − ρ)R.
2
Now I compare these payoffs to the expected complete information payoffs, with the
expectation taken with respect to the probability distribution Π and using the responderpays discovery cost allocation rule. Plaintiffs in that scenario can be shown to obtain an
average payoff of 21 (α+λ)+βR, where we recall that β is the share of the Coasean surplus
the plaintiff would obtain via bargaining in the counterfactual complete information
world. Defendants can be shown to obtain an average payoff of −c−(α+λ)/2+(1−β)R.
31 Note

that by the revelation principle, Myerson (1981), there is no loss of generality in
defining these transfer functions directly in terms of the parties’ signals.
32 That is, it satisfies the interim individual rationality constraint governing participation
decisions of an agent who knows her own type but knows only the probability distribution over
the other agent’s type.
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By setting ρ = β, the mechanism designing court can give the parties exactly the
payoffs they would receive under complete information with the responder-pays discovery
cost allocation rule. In fact, by varying ρ all the way from 0 to 1, the court can achieve a
wide array of payoff distributions. Thus, using the augmented mechanism is like stapling
together the Coase theorem and the second fundamental welfare theorem: not only does
it achieve the ex post efficient allocation of resources with respect to discovery, it also
achieves the functional equivalent of the distribution of welfare corresponding to any
court-chosen distribution of bargaining power between the parties, given the discovery
cost allocation rule.
What if we instead assume the default rule is that the responder owns the right
to avoid requested discovery? Under the responder-can-refuse discovery cost allocation
rule, expected payoffs would be 18 β(α − c − λ) for plaintiffs and 81 (1 − β)(α − c − λ)
for defendants. A class of mechanisms similar to the one constructed for the responderpays case can be shown to exist, such that the parties’ expected payoffs under these
mechanisms are.
In sum, if the class of mechanisms described above were feasible, they would allow the
court to achieve discovery-resource allocation goals while holding the payoff distribution
at its status quo, or achieving any of a wide range of possible distributions. Of course,
these mechanisms require the court to have an enormous amount of information, which it
is not plausible the court will have. Accordingly, I turn next to discuss the performance
of several mechanisms that would be administratively feasible.
4

Feasible Mechanisms

Throughout this section, I drop the assumption that the court knows the particular
values of any of the parameters c, λ, or α, or the probability distribution over types.
Here I consider three administratively feasible mechanisms. The first involves the holding
of an auction over the right to request or refuse discovery. Second, I consider a postedprice mechanism. Third, I offer some brief observations concerning the Chatterjee and
Samuelson (1983) split-the-difference mechanism.
4.1

Auctioning Off the Right to Discovery

One possibility is to auction off the right to demand or avoid discovery. The court could
hold a second-price, sealed-bid auction. It is well known that bidding one’s valuation is
a weakly dominant strategy in such auctions with private values. If the parties did so,
then the plaintiff would win the auction when her signal is sp = 1 and the defendant’s
is sd = 0. The plaintiff would then have to pay the court c + λ—the defendant’s overall
cost of providing the discovery—and would gain the discovery that plaintiff values at α.
In the other three states, the defendant would win the auction. In two of these, those
in which sp = 0, the defendant would pay the plaintiff’s bid, which is λ. In the fourth
state, which happens with probability 3/8, the defendant would bid c+α and the plaintiff
would bid α, so the defendant would pay the court α. Before any auction revenue were
redistributed to the parties, the auction would afford the plaintiff an expected payoff of
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(1/8)(α − c − λ); the defendant’s expected payoff would be −[(1/8)c + (3/8)α + (5/8)λ].
Notice that these payoffs are the same sign as those received by the parties under the
responder-pays rule without trade. However, the magnitudes are less favorable to the
plaintiff and more favorable to the defendant.
I have not yet discussed the auction’s revenue. Averaged over all party-type combinations, the revenue equals (1/8)c + (3/8)α + (5/8)λ. If this revenue could somehow
be redistributed as a lump-sum transfer to the plaintiff, it would leave the plaintiff with
(α + λ)/2, exactly equal to the ex ante payoff a plaintiff with no bargaining power would
receive under complete information with a default rule of responder pays. Thus with
distribution of all revenue to the plaintiff, the second-price auction rule is equivalent
to a responder-pays system in which the plaintiff has no bargaining power, so that she
captures none of the surplus from discovery settlement.
But notice that if the court does not know α, c, and the probability distribution of
types, then it would have a hard time determining how much to transfer in lump-sum
fashion. That it is important because any distribution of the auction revenue must be
done so as not to affect the parties’ incentives, if we wish to retain the auction’s incentive
compatibility. If all disputes really had the simple parameters and type distribution
assumed for illustration, then the court could just average over the first few trials.
But since real-world conditions will have heterogeneous types and cost and discovery
parameters, which the court won’t know in advance, it seems unlikely that the court
would be able to calibrate lump sum transfers very precisely.33
In sum, auctioning off the discovery right would avoid disfavored discovery and provide discovery when it is privately subjectively efficient to do so. It would also raise
revenue via the auction, which could be redistributed to the parties, though under the
informational assumptions of this section, it would be difficult for the court to know
how to do so. Finally, in the absence of any redistribution of auction revenue, and even
likely with such redistribution, an auction approach would redistribute ex ante payoffs
from plaintiffs to defendants relative to the status quo rule.
4.2

Posted Prices

As footnote 10 explains, a proposed amendment to Rule 26(c) would allow the court
to allocate some or all of the costs of discovery to the requester. Suppose the court
orders that the responder must provide the requested discovery, but only if the requester
reimburses the responder by some stated amount p. This is an example of a posted-price
mechanism with the discovery right initially assigned to the requester. In general, given
a discovery cost allocation rule, a court using the posted-price approach would announce
a price, p, and the discovery right would be transferred from the default holder to the
other party if and only if both parties agreed to transact at that price.
An attractive feature of the posted-price mechanism is its administrative simplicity.
33 The

existence of a surplus is a standard result with the use of Vickrey-Clarke-Groves
mechanisms, of which the second-price, sealed-bid auction is an example. What to do with the
surplus is a well known problem.
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In addition, it is dominant-strategy incentive compatible,34 so we can again work with the
parties’ actual valuations. Unfortunately, the mechanism is not ex post efficient except
by luck. To illustrate, suppose the requester owns the discovery right. Suppose the court
doesn’t know the value of λ, α, c, or any linear combination of these parameters. If the
court chooses p < λ, then the plaintiff-requester will not agree to trade when sp = 0, and
there will be no trade, even though the responder would be willing to pay more than λ.
Thus it is inefficient for discovery to occur when sp = 0, but with a poorly chosen price,
the posted-price mechanism will yield that result. For another example, suppose the
responder-can-refuse rule is in place. If the court chooses p < c + λ, then the responder
will not agree to sell when sd = 0, even though the requester would be willing to pay
more than c + λ. With a low enough posted price, then, discovery does not occur even
when it would be subjectively efficient.
In both cases, the parties will truthfully reveal whether they would be willing to
transact at the posted price, but that won’t matter since the court errs by posting a
price below the reservation value of the discovery right’s default owner. Thus, the risk
of the posted-price approach is that too little trade will occur if the court lacks the
information necessary to make a good price choice.
4.3

Splitting the Difference

A final administratively feasible mechanism is the Chatterjee-Samuelson (“CS”) split
the difference mechanism. With this mechanism, the parties each report prices. If the
reported price for the owner of the discovery right exceeds the reported price for the
other party, then no transfer of the discovery right occurs. If instead the discovery right
owner reports the lower price, then the discovery right is transferred at the average
of the two reported prices. Truthtelling is not a weakly dominant strategy with this
mechanism. Conditional on the occurrence of a transfer, each party would do better if
it moved its reported price in the direction of the other party’s report. Thus the parties
have incentives to bid strategically. Consequently, trade will sometimes fail to occur
when it would be efficient as with the posted-price mechanism.
5

The Role of Pre-Discovery Settlement

As noted above, joint stipulations aside, we do not generally hear about discovery
settlements—in other words, we do not hear about agreements in which one side pays
the other money in return for a unilateral stipulation not to pursue discovery as to a
matter.
One reason why not is an inference related to adverse selection, one that is essentially
assumed away in the model above. If a defendant offered a plaintiff a large amount of
money to forego discovery on a particular matter, a reasonable plaintiff might well
assume that the defendant must know the discovery will yield evidence with a high
34 See

Yamashita (2015), who also discusses certain robust optimality properties that postedprice mechanisms have.
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value to the plaintiff. Thus, the plaintiff would update her beliefs concerning the value of
discovery and reject the offer; she might even demand more discovery than she otherwise
would have. Of course, it is possible that the defendant simply has a high cost of
providing discovery. In many cases the defendant should be able to credibly demonstrate
that her discovery costs are high (the proportionality standard certainly seems predicated
on this idea), so the adverse selection explanation may not be universally relevant.
Whatever the reason that we do not see discovery settlements, we certainly do often
see overall case settlements in the period before major discovery occurs. A natural question is whether overall settlements are functionally equivalent to discovery settlements.
Assume the responder pays discovery cost allocation rule is in place, and assume that
discovery settlements never happen. The following table reports the overall payoffs of
each player given each pair of signal values, together with the surplus:
(sp , sd )
(0, 0)
(0, 1)
(1, 0)
(1, 1)

Plaintiff
q−τ +λ
q−τ +λ
q−τ +α
q−τ +α

Payoffs
Defendant
Surplus
−(τ + c + λ)
2τ − q + c
−(τ + c + α) 2τ − q + c + α − λ
−(τ + c + λ) 2τ − q − [α − c − λ]
−(τ + c + α)
2τ − q + c

Settle pre-discovery?
If and only if c > q − 2τ .
If and only if c + (α − λ) > q − 2τ .
No.
If and only if c > q − 2τ .

It is useful to compare the surplus in each of the four signal states to the surplus in
the event of trial with only common knowledge evidence. We saw in section 2 that this
latter surplus is 2τ − q, which is negative. In the (1, 0) state, the fact that discovery is
subjectively efficient causes overall surplus to become even more negative: the possibility
of discovery in this realized signal state makes overall settlement even less of a good idea,
subjectively, than it would be if only common knowledge evidence were available.
However, in all three other states, the possibility of discovery increases the surplus
from settlement. This is true because in each of these states, conducting discovery is
worth subjectively less to the plaintiff than avoiding it is worth to the defendant. If
the defendant’s cost of conducting discovery is large enough—if c > q − 2τ —then there
will be positive surplus from overall case settlement due to the possibility of discovery.
Further, even if discovery doesn’t cost that much, it is possible that surplus is positive
in the (sp , sd ) = (0, 1) state, since in that state we require only c + α − λ > q − 2τ , and
we assumed that α > λ. In fact, the condition c > q − 2τ ≡ c∗ is sufficient for there
to be positive settlement surplus in three of the four states—seven-eighths of the time.
When c > c∗ , there will be positive pre-discovery settlement surplus if and only if discovery settlements would be efficient. Of course, with private information about ex ante
discovery-related beliefs, there is no guarantee that pre-discovery settlement will occur
just because surplus is available. Still, this discussion shows that even when efficient
discovery settlements aren’t feasible for some reason, there is at least the possibility that
discovery costs (and, sometimes, differences in party assessments of discovery results)
will grease the wheels of overall settlement.
Two further points warrant discussion here. First, it is well understood that high
discovery costs might be the cause of pre-discovery settlements. This observation is typ-
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ically made ominously. For example, in his memorandum forwarding the proposed Rule
26 amendments, Advisory Committee Chair Judge David G. Campbell characterized
public commenters who favored the proposal as “assert[ing] that costs of discovery in
civil litigation are too often out of proportion to the issues at stake in the litigation,
resulting in ... settlements made to avoid litigation costs regardless of the merits.”35
And the Supreme Court has made the point, too, emphasizing
the potential for possible abuse of the liberal discovery provisions of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure ... [via, among other things,] extensive
discovery of business documents....To the extent that this process eventually
produces relevant evidence which is useful in determining the merits of the
claims asserted by the parties, it bears the imprimatur of those Rules and of
the many cases liberally interpreting them. But to the extent that it permits
a plaintiff with a largely groundless claim to simply take up the time of a
number of other people, with the right to do so representing an in terrorem
increment of the settlement value, rather than a reasonably founded hope
that the process will reveal relevant evidence, it is a social cost rather than
a benefit. Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 US 723, 741 (1975).
In the context of my little model, we might think of the Blue Chip Stamps Court
as expressing concern over the possibility that settlement will be enabled when the
sp = sd = 0 signal state is realized. In this situation, both parties expect discovery to
yield little of use to the plaintiff, but settlement might occur, and on decent terms for the
plaintiff, if the cost of discovery, c, is large enough. The flipside of such a concern is that
in the signal state sp = sd = 1, both parties think discovery will yield highly valuable
evidence, settlement surplus is the same as in the sp = sd = 0 case. Presumably, the Blue
Chip Stamps Court would endorse a settlement made possible by high discovery costs
in that situation; certainly the Marek v. Chesny Court should, given its endorsement of
a federal policy of encouraging settlement of “all lawsuits.”
Thus, the same high discovery costs that inappropriately enable settlement and “in
terrorem” increments to settlement amounts also enable discovery-avoiding settlements
that courts tend to view as beneficial. This discussion points to the possibility that there
may be a need for federal courts to make trade offs among policy goals that cannot all
be achieved: it is not clear that it will be possible simultaneously to (i) encourage
settlement of plausibly meritorious suits, (ii) avoid the use of discovery costs as a lever
to increase settlement value when discovery is likely to have low value to the plaintiff,
and (iii) avoid major departures from the default rule that responders bear the costs of
discovery. Policy discussions related to proportionality in discovery have not generally
recognized this tension.
The second point is that if the reason the parties can’t efficiently forge discovery
settlements has to do with informational bargaining problems, then we shouldn’t be
too quick to assume that pre-discovery overall settlements will occur simply because
35 See

5.

Hon. David G. Campbell, Memorandum to Hon. Jeffrey Sutton, June 14, 2014, page
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settlement surplus is positive. The parties surely can be expected to price their expectations related to discovery into pre-discovery overall settlements. Bargaining problems
with discovery settlements might thus be expected to migrate into the pre-discovery
stage. The assumption that parties always realize positive settlement surplus is surely
more tenuous in this situation than when only common knowledge evidence is involved.
Further analysis of this issue is beyond the scope of the present paper.
6

Conclusion

This paper has discussed a number of issues related to changes likely to take effect,
later this year, in the rules governing discovery in U.S. civil litigation. Added emphasis
on the “proportionality” of discovery may require trial courts to determine when and
on what terms certain discovery requests—presumably, relatively expensive ones whose
value to the requester is disputed—will be allowed. My focus in this paper has been
on the extent to which judicial involvment in such disputes is really necessary, on the
allocative and distributional effects of changing the default rule that responders pay, and
on administratively feasible mechanisms judges might consider using when they must
get involved.
One result of the paper’s highly stylized model is that if the court has enough information to implement anything like a real cost-benefit test concerning disputed discovery,
then—for dependently distributed types—it would also have enough information to implement a kind of Nirvana mechanism. This mechanism is incentive compatible, interim
individually rational, and ex post efficient, it has a balanced budget, and it allows the
court to pick among a wide range of distributional consequences. Essentially, the mechanism allows the court to reproduce what would happen if the parties had complete
information and could bargain costlessly.
In reality, the court is unlikely to have such detailed information. Thus, it will have
to resort to administratively feasible mechanisms for adjudicating discovery proportionality disputes. I discuss three such mechanisms. A second-price auction of the discovery
right induces truth-telling and efficient allocation of discovery resources but entails a
substantial, and surely controversial, redistribution away from plaintiffs relative to the
default discovery cost allocation rule. A posted-price mechanism avoids such distributional effects, but if the court is unlucky in its price choice, discovery can be either underor over-used (depending on the default rule over discovery rights). A split-the-difference
mechanism may induce strategic behavior that also leads to inefficiencies.
In sum, all of the administratively feasible mechanisms considered have some important drawback. And which drawback is worse generally will depend on the very
parameters the court is assumed not to know. I conclude that while mechanism design
could do great things for a court with great information, it may be of limited help for
one with limited information.
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